Foreign Depositions in Ohio and the Uniform Act by Harley, Max
Foreign Depositions in Ohio and the Uniform Act
Faced with the difficulty of obtaining essential testimony from
a witness outside the state, a party to a suit may, in general, resort
to one of two procedures. Adopted through admiralty procedure
from the civil law,' letters rogatory or letters requisitory may be
addressed from the court in which the action is pending to a court
of general jurisdiction in the state where the witness may be found.
Acceptance is based on comity and such letters are normally ap-
proved by the exercise of inherent powers of courts of general
jurisdiction.2 A court, when petitioned by a party, may also execute
a commission to a designated person or to authorized persons gen-
erally to take such testimony as requested. A fundamental distinc-
tion is that when letters rogatory are used the court to which the
appeal is made establishes the rules, and where a commission is
issued the rules may be established and controlled by the executing
court consonant with the grant of power of the acceding state.3
By statute Ohio establishes efficacious methods for meeting the
problem, whether the deposition is to be taken in other jurisdictions
for use within Ohio or to be taken in Ohio for use elsewhere. Enu-
merated officers of other states and jurisdictions are authorized to
take depositions for use in Ohio courts.4 Any coercive process must
be granted by the jurisdiction in which the deposition is taken, but
the trial court may review the process when it tests the admissi-
bility of the deposition.' This accords with the basic distinction be-
tween the right to take and the right to use such testimony.
'Discussed in Kiebling v. Lieberman, 9 Phila. 160, 162 (Dist. Ct. 1873).
2DeVilleneuve v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 206 Fed. 70 (S.D. N.Y.
1913); Gross v. Palmer, 105 Fed. 833 (N.D. Ill. 1900); In re Martinelli, 219
Mass. 58, 106 N.E. 557 (1914) (limited in aid of cause pending in court
issuing); Stengel v. Stengel, 85 N.J. Eq. 277, 96 Atl. 358 (Ch. 1915) (if the
testimony cannot otherwise be obtained); Vandergrift v. Oler, 19 Pa.
D. & C. 360 (C.P. 1933); Ex parte Taylor, 110 Tex. 331, 220 S.W. 74 (1920)
(discretionary); Hite v. Keene, 137 Wis. 625, 119 N.W. 303 (1909).
a People v. Rushworth, 294 11. 455, 128 N.E. 555 (1920).
4 OHmo Gm. CODE § 11531 (1938). (Those listed are judge, justice or
chancellor of any court of record, justice of peace, notary public, mayor or
chief magistrate of any municipality, commission appointed by the gover-
nor of the state or any person authorized by a special commission from Ohio
to take depositions either in the United States or in any foreign country, or
a consular officer of the United States within his consular district.) See
Gibson v. McArthur, 5 Ohio 329 (1832), where mayor of a municipality
within the District of Columbia was held not to be an authorized officer
of a "state" within the wording of a similar statute.
5 Devine v. Detroit Trust Co., 52 Ohio App. 446, 3 N.E. 2d 1001 (1935)
(Notice and service in Michigan was reviewed).
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Authority to take testimony within Ohio is extended to officers
or commissioners appointed by courts of other states, territories, or
districts.6 It is not apparent whether such statutes permit a. party
to a suit to initiate the process or whether he must petition the court
in which the action is pending. No case is found in which initiation
was by a party without aid of a court, but there is none in which
such procedure was attacked. Manifestly, this may be done if tes-
timony is to be taken in Ohio for use in Ohio courts.' Although
certain officers deriving their powers from other jurisdictions are
designated as capable of taking testimony within Ohio,8 the provi-
sions may not be restrictive and the party who wishes the deposition
taken may apply to an officer who derives his authority from the
state of Ohio without initial petition to the court.9
Neither is it clear whether depositions may be taken within
Ohio for a cause pending in courts of a foreign country. The statute
authorizing foreign deposition procedure contains the phrase, "...
in an action, cause, or matter pending before any court or authority
without this state." 10 Certainly, the grant of extra-territorial power
is limited to an ".... officer who derives his authority from the state,
district or territory in which they are to be used." 11
Where the procedure is to produce a deposition for use in Ohio
courts, initiation does not require the assistance of a court, except
where it is taken before a special commission; 12 issuance of sub-
poenas and notice to the adverse party are within the power of an
authorized officer. 3 This power can compel production of books or
documents under a subpoena duces tecum.14 By another statute
refusal to appear, refusal to be sworn, an unlawful refusal to pro-
duce books or documents, or to answer, or to subscribe a deposition
6 OHIo GEl. CODE § 11530 (1938); Limited to actions, causes or matters
pending, by Section 11528.
7 OHIO GEN. CODE §§ 11534, 11535 (1938); In re Rauh, 65 Ohio St. 128,
61 N.E. 701 (1901).
8 OHIO GEN. CODE § 11530 (1938).
9 OHIo GEN. CODE §§ 11529, 11530 (1938).
10 OHIO GEN. CODE § 11528 (1938).
1 OHIo GEN. CODE § 11530 (1938).
12 OHIO GEN. CODE § 11534 (1938).
is OHIO GEN. CODE § 11502 (1938); Shaw v. Ohio Edison Installation
Co., 9 Ohio Dec. Rep. 809 (Super. Ct. 1882). For criminal cases, application
to court is required under Ohio General Code Section 13444-11. State v.
Wing, 66 Ohio St. 407, 64 N.E. 514 (1902); Dickey v. Brokaw, 53 Ohio App.
141, 4 N.E. 2d 411 (1936). Such application is also necessary in a proceed-
ing to perpetuate testimony under Ohio General Code Sections 12216 and
12217.
14 Ex parte Bevan, 126 Ohio St. 126, 184 N.E. 393 (1933); Ex parte




may be punished by any officer who can require attendance.15 The
refusal to appear or the refusal to be sworn is unlawful by statute; 11
the unlawfulness of a refusal to answer, to produce documents, or to
subscribe depends upon the basis of the refusal and its accuracy.
There is no contempt of the latter category unless an order has been
"lawfully" made by the officer and the witness refuses to obey the
order.7 It seems that the mere putting of a question with no demand
by the officer for an answer will not form the basis of contempt for
refusal or neglect to answer. 8 Where the witness refuses to-answer
on the ground of privilege and a commitment is made, a habeas
corpus proceeding may be had to determine the legality of the
claimed privilege. If the privilege was present, the commitment
order is "unlawful." 19 1
Apparently a recent decision 20 changed the attitude toward
review of a commitment for a refusal based on materiality, compe-
tence, or relevance. The case of In re Martin, Jr.21 categorically
states that such issues cannot be raised in a habeas corpus proceed-
ing, but only in the trial court when the deposition is offered in
eyidence. Inconsistent statements in prior decisions were distin-
guished by citing them in connection with questions of privilege,
though such were not readily apparent in the cases7 A prior hold-
ing to the contrary was overruled and a different decision in the
same case was reversed.2 3 This overruling of Ex parte Schoepf 24
precludes the possibility of a distinction between depositions taken
for use outside the state, as in the Martin case, and those for use in
Ohio courts, as in the Schoepf case. There is no rule permitting a
witness to object to questions because they call for immaterial, in-
competent, or irrelevant testimony. This decision is compatible
with the right of a party to exclude testimony on such grounds at
the trial, where a more competent ruling can be made; the opposite
15 OHIo GEN. CODE § 11510 (1938).
16 Ibid.
17 Burnside v. Dewstoe, 9 Ohio Dec. Rep. 589 (C.P. 1886).
is Ibid.
1' Ex parte Jennings, 60 Ohio St. 319, 54 N.E. 202 (1899); semble. In re
Martin, Jr., 141 Ohio St. 87, 47 N.E. 2d 388 (1943), was distinguished on
the basis of privilege; the privilege apparently being that disclosure would
injure the business of the witness. In re Rauh, 65 Ohio St. 128, 61 N.E.
701 (1901).
2 0 In re Martin, Jr., supra note 19, overruling In re Martin, Jr., 139
Ohio St. 609, 41 N.E. 2d 702 (1942).
21141 Ohio St. 87, 47 N.E. 2d 388 (1943).
22 Ex parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906); Ex parte Jen-
nings, 60 Ohio St. 319, 54 N.E. 262 (1899); See note 20 supra.
23 n re Martin, Jr., 139 Ohio St. 609, 41 N.E. 2d 702 (1942); Ex parte
Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906), syllabus 4.
2 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906).
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rule might result in an isolated ruling unduly restricting a trial
court, whether in a sister jurisdiction or in this state.
The deposition procedure has been used to obtain discovery 2
and to examine an adverse party "as if under cross-examination." 21
Concerning use of the deposition procedure by foreign parties, Ohio
General Code Section 11528 states simply, "Depositions also may be
taken when the testimony is required in an action, cause, or matter
pending before any court or authority without this state." It might
be argued that this would open cross-examination of the adversary
or discovery to a party in an out-of-state suit. This contention can-
not be made for perpetuation of testimony, because the statute regu-
lating petitions for such process requires an allegation that the
applicant is, or expects to be, a party to an action in a court in this
state,2T and the deposition statute requires a matter pending.28
Section 57 of the Restatement of Conflicts of Laws states the
general rule that a state cannot exercise executive jurisdiction with-
out its territorial limits. But Comment (b) under this section recog-
nizes that a commission may operate without state limits and that
the officer using such commission may administer oaths and take
testimony.
The Uniform Foreign Depositions Act plainly permits officers
acting under a commission to compel attendance and extends this
grant to commissions or writs issuing out of foreign countries.2 9 It
is broad enough to authorize recognition of letters rogatory or of
powers under a commission issued out of another jurisdiction. By
reference to the phrase, "... . or whenever upon notice or agreement
it is required to take testimony of a witness or witnesses in this
state .... ," it may be contended that application need not be made
to the trial jurisdiction for authorization, but that parties on agree-
ment may initiate by applying to authorized officers granted power
under laws of the state where application is made. It is not clear
whether the Act requires that an action, as distinguished from a
special proceeding, be pending in another jurisdiction before the
application may be made. The final phrase of Section 1 of the Act,
"... [that] witnesses may be compelled to appear and testify in
25 0Ho GEN. CODE § 11555 (1938).
26 OHio GEN. CODE § 11497 (1938).
27 OHio GEN. CODE § 12217 (1938).
28 OHio GEN. CODE § 11528 (1938).
29 "Whenever any mandate, writ or commission is issued out of any
court of record in any other state, territory, district or foreign jurisdiction,
or whenever upon notice or agreement it is required to take the testimony
of a witness or witnesses in this state, witnesses may be compelled to appear
and testify in the same manner and by the same process and proceeding as
may be employed for the purpose of taking testimony in proceedings pend-




the same manner and by the same process and proceedings as may
be employed for the purpose of taking testimony in proceedings
pending in this state," may be restricted to such a situation. It may
be possible, however, to assert that other statutory procedures used
within the state implement the Act.
In Christ v. Superior Court,30 letters rogatory were issued from
a Guatemalan court; the allegation was that the petitioner was
about to commence an action in that court. The deposition proce-
dure in California, the state of the petitioned court, permitted open-
ing the procedure at any time after service in an action or after an
issue of fact was raised in a special proceeding.3 1 In addition to the
Uniform Foreign Depositions Act,32 the state had a statute permit-
ting a party to an action or special proceeding in a court of a sister
state to obtain testimony within California to be used in the action
or proceeding.3 In ordering recognition and execution of the let-
ters, the court assumed that a special proceeding not unlike their
statutory perpetuation process 34 was being had in Guatemala, and
that such process, as a special proceeding, would satisfy both
statutes.
A liberal and convenient procedure for taking depositions could
be provided in Ohio by modification of the perpetuation statute and
the enactment of the Uniform Foreign Depositions Act. With or
without a presumption, the Uniform Act could embrace cross-
examination of adverse parties, discovery, and perpetuation.
Max Harley
30 211 Cal. 593, 296 Pac. 612 (1931).
S1 CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. ANN. § 2021 (1946).
32 CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. ANN. § 2036a (1946).
3 3 CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. ANN. § 2035 (1946).
34 CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. ANN. § 2083 (1946).
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